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I.  INTRODUCTION 
For nearly seventy-five years, the “marketplace of ideas” has been 
regarded as the central metaphor of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s 
dissent in Abrams v. United States1 and of free speech theory in general.  
No other image has so captured the public imagination or generated 
such fierce academic argument.2  Legal scholars, historians, and 
economists have filled countless pages debating what Holmes meant by 
“free trade in ideas,” how he defined “truth,” and whether the 
“competition of the market” is really “the best test” of that truth.3 
 
*Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law.  Thanks to Zachary Sinkiewicz 
for excellent research assistance and to the editors of the Seton Hall Law Review for 
superb editorial work. 
 1 250 U.S. 616, 624–31 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 2 See Joseph Blocher, Institutions in the Marketplace of Ideas, 57 DUKE L.J. 821, 824–
25 (2008) (“Never before or since has a Justice conceived a metaphor that has done so 
much to change the way that courts, lawyers, and the public understand an entire area 
of constitutional law.”). 
 3 See Thomas W. Joo, The Worst Test of Truth: The ‘Marketplace of Ideas’ as Faulty 
Metaphor, 89 TUL. L. REV. 383, 396 (2014); Daniel E. Ho & Frederick Schauer, Testing the 
Marketplace of Ideas, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1160 (2015); Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the 
Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of Free Speech Protection, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 595 (2011); Vincent Blasi, Holmes and the Marketplace of Ideas, 2004 SUP. CT. REV. 
1; Alvin I. Goldman & James C. Cox, Speech, Truth, and the Free Market for Ideas, 2 Legal 
Theory 1, 19–26 (1996); William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First 
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995); Albert Breton & Ronald 
Wintrobe, Freedom of Speech vs. Efficient Regulation in Markets for Ideas, 17 J. ECON. 
BEHAV. & ORG. 217 (1992); C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 6–24 
(1989); Richard Posner, Free Speech in an Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1 
(1986); Christopher T. Wonnell, Truth and the Marketplace of Ideas, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. 
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These debates have proved illuminating and fruitful, but they have 
also had the effect of crowding out alternative ways of thinking about 
free speech—of monopolizing the market, so to speak.  In my 
contribution to this symposium, I want to explore another metaphor 
from Holmes’s Abrams dissent, a metaphor that has been frequently 
overlooked but may offer a better framework for understanding his 
view of free speech.  I am referring to the metaphor of the experiment. 
Holmes uses the word “experiment” three times in the final 
paragraph of his Abrams dissent.  After asserting that the conception of 
free speech he has articulated is “the theory of our Constitution,” he 
states, “It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”4  Two sentences 
later he returns to the image, writing, “While that experiment is part of 
our system I think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts 
to check the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be 
fraught with death . . . .”5  He also uses the word “test” (“the best test of 
truth”),6 which, depending upon the context, can be a synonym for 
“experiment.”  Yet despite these repeated references, there has been 
almost no discussion of what Holmes meant by the experiment 
metaphor or what it might reveal about his thinking.7  To some extent, 
the fault may lie with Holmes.  As Vincent Blasi has pointed out, 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent contains an “astonishingly rich set of 
allusions,” from his invocation of the market to his assertion that “time 
has upset many fighting faiths” to his claim that we must “wager our 
salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”8  
 
REV. 669 (1986); Stanley Ingber, The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 
1984 DUKE L.J. 1 (1984). 
 4 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added).  
 5 Id. (emphasis added). 
 6 Id. 
 7 The most extensive discussions I am aware of can be found in Blasi supra note 3, 
at 4, 19, 46 (drawing connections between the market metaphor and Holmes’s allusion 
to experimentation) and Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in First 
Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CAL L. REV. 2353, 2360 (2000) (arguing that Holmes’s use 
of the word “experiment” “strongly suggests that the Abrams dissent is best understood 
as an expression of American pragmatic epistemology”). 
 8 Blasi, supra note 3, at 4; see also LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF 
IDEAS IN AMERICA 432 (2002) (stating that “[t]he marketplace is not the only metaphor in 
Holmes’s opinion”).  In his correspondence, Holmes relied upon yet another metaphor 
for free speech.  Writing to Zechariah Chafee a few months after his Abrams dissent, 
Holmes offered the “isolated reflection that with effervescing opinions, as with the not 
yet forgotten champagnes, the quickest way to let them get flat is to let them get exposed 
to air.”  OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES ET AL., JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: HIS BOOK NOTICES 
AND UNCOLLECTED LETTERS AND PAPERS 137 (Harry C. Shriver ed., 1936). 
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With so many “suggestive and loaded figurations,”9 perhaps it is no 
surprise that we have overlooked one. 
But some of the blame, no doubt, lies with us.  We have been so 
dazzled by the market metaphor—and the debates it has engendered—
that we have given it undue attention, neglecting the other images and 
references Holmes sprinkled throughout his Abrams dissent.10  This has 
been a mistake.11  And it has been compounded by the fact that, in many 
ways, the market metaphor is an unlikely image for Holmes to have 
relied on and for us to have prioritized over his other contributions. 
II.  AN UNLIKELY METAPHOR 
For starters, Holmes was not much of an economist.  Although he 
showed an interest in economics,12 as he did with just about every 
subject of serious concern, those who knew him were unimpressed with 
his grasp of the topic.  Francis Biddle, who spent a year as a secretary 
for Holmes and later served as United States Attorney General, wrote 
that “it is not far from the mark to conclude that his thinking in the field 
of economics stopped at twenty-five.”13  The philosopher Morris Cohen, 
a frequent correspondent, lamented the “backwardness of his 
fundamental economic views.”14   
Furthermore, although Holmes, like nearly every other member of 
the New England establishment, embraced free-market capitalism, he 
never made a fetish of it like many of his peers.15  He had several friends, 
including Harold Laski, who were socialists, and he made a concerted 
 
 9 Blasi, supra note 3, at 4.  
 10 I include myself in the indictment.  Until recently, I paid almost no attention to the 
metaphor of the experiment.  See Thomas Healy, Anxiety and Influence: Learned Hand 
and the Making of a Free Speech Dissent, 50 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 803, 827–29 (2018). 
 11 See Blasi, supra note 3, at 4 (“The challenge for one who would make sense 
of Holmes is to avoid being swept away by any one of his seductive formulations.”). 
 12 See Blasi, supra note 3, at 5–6.  
 13 FRANCIS BIDDLE, MR. JUSTICE HOLMES 86–87 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 
1942).  
 14 MORRIS R. COHEN, THE FAITH OF A LIBERAL: SELECTED ESSAYS 29 (1946). 
 15 It is true, as Louis Menand has pointed out, that Holmes “had a kind of schoolboy’s 
respect” for the “energy and willpower” of industrial titans such as John D. Rockefeller, 
J.P. Morgan, and James T. Hill.  See MENAND, supra note 8, at 65.  But unlike many of his 
peers, Holmes could imagine, with a certain degree of detachment and acceptance, a 
world in which capitalism was replaced by socialism.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 
652, 673 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“If, in the long run, the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the 
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance 
and have their way.”). 
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effort to understand their view.16  On one occasion, while serving on the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, he even visited the home of a 
local labor leader to inquire what it was that workers wanted.  And 
though he came away from the conversation unconvinced, he reported 
to a friend that he and the man had “discoursed several times with some 
little profit.”17   
So it’s more than a little surprising that Holmes would ground his 
defense of free speech in a comparison to laissez-faire economics.  And 
outside of his Abrams dissent, he never did.  Not once before or after 
Abrams did Holmes ever discuss free speech in terms of economic 
theory or the competition of the market.18  Nowadays we automatically 
associate Holmes with the market metaphor.  Yet Holmes never 
returned to that image in the handful of subsequent dissents he wrote 
on the topic of free speech.19  Nor did Justice Louis Brandeis in the many 
free speech opinions he wrote, several of which Holmes joined.20  Nor, 
as far as I can tell, did any of the young acolytes who lavished praise on 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent.  Not Laski or Learned Hand.  Not Felix 
Frankfurter or Zechariah Chafee.  Not Roscoe Pound, Walter Lippmann, 
or Herbert Croly.   
Detractors also largely ignored the market metaphor.  Most of the 
early academic criticism of Holmes’s dissent focused on his 
interpretation of the Sedition Act’s intent requirement.21  It was not until 
 
 16 See THOMAS HEALY, THE GREAT DISSENT: HOW OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES CHANGED HIS 
MIND—AND CHANGED THE HISTORY OF FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA 30–35 (2013). 
 17 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (January 20, 1893), in 1 
MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 44 (1942). 
 18 The closest he came was in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107 (1896) (Holmes 
J., dissenting), in which he invoked “free competition” as a basis for opposing an 
injunction against a labor protest in front of a business.  But the case was not framed as 
one involving free speech, and Holmes did not discuss it in those terms.  
 19 These dissents include United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929) (Holmes, 
J., dissenting); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); United 
States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democrat Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 20 See Joo, supra note 3, at 386.  Brandeis’s free speech opinions include Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring); United States ex rel. Milwaukee 
Social Democrat Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); 
Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Pierce v. United States, 
252 U.S. 239 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); and Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 
(1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
 21 See, e.g., Edwin S. Corwin, Freedom of Speech and Press under the First Amendment: 
A Resumé, 30 YALE L.J. 48 (1920); Day Kimball, The Espionage Act and the Limits of Legal 
Toleration, 33 HARV. L. REV. 442 (1920); C.W. German, An Unfortunate Dissent, 21 U. MO. 
BULL. L. SER. 65 (1920).  The most vitriolic attack was written by Professor John Henry 
Wigmore, a long-time admirer of Holmes.  He did briefly critique the market metaphor, 
arguing that the truth might not prevail quickly enough to avoid disaster.  See John Henry 
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the Cold War era, when the United States was obsessed with the spread 
of communism, that the market metaphor emerged as a legal and 
cultural touchstone for thinking about free speech.22  And, as Thomas 
Joo has argued, that development likely had less to do with Holmes or 
with the metaphor’s explanatory power than with a desire to connect 
America’s expressive freedom with laissez-faire economics and thus to 
draw a contrast with the statism of the Soviet Union.23  
As for Holmes, he seems to have arrived at the market metaphor 
almost entirely by chance.  The summer before he wrote his Abrams 
dissent, he read a biography of Adam Smith that had been given to him 
by Laski.24  In addition to emphasizing the extent to which Smith 
believed in free speech and religious tolerance, the biography made 
repeated use of the phrase “free trade,” including as a chapter title.  That 
phrase, of course, became a central part of Holmes’s market metaphor 
in Abrams.  “But when men have realized that time has upset many 
fighting faiths,” he wrote, “they may come to believe even more than 
they believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate 
good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas—that the best test 
of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the 
competition of the market[.]”25   
Thus, as often happened with Holmes, the market metaphor 
appears to be a clever and arresting formulation that he summoned into 
existence without fully thinking through its implications and without 
intending for it to serve as an overarching formula for resolving 
questions about the meaning or scope of the First Amendment.26  This 
conclusion is supported by the fact that Holmes told Frankfurter he 
 
Wigmore, Abrams v. U.S.: Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in War-Time and 
Peace-Time, 14 ILL. L. REV. 539, 550–51 (1920).  But Wigmore also mocked Holmes’s 
comparison of the Constitution to an experiment, writing, “In the transcendental realms 
of philosophic and historical discussion by closet jurists, these expressions might pass.  
But when found publicly recorded in an opinion of the Supreme Guardians of the 
Constitution, licensing propaganda which in the next case before the court may be 
directed against that Constitution itself, this language is ominous indeed.”  Id. at 561. 
 22 According to Vincent Blasi, the phrase “market place of ideas” first appeared in a 
1935 letter to the editor of the New York Times concerning the upcoming presidential 
election.  See Blasi, supra note 3, at 13 n.41.  But the phrase did not appear in a Supreme 
Court opinion until after World War II.  See Joo, supra note 3, at 393–400; Ho & Schauer, 
supra note 3, at 1161 n.3. 
 23 Joo, supra note 3, at 396.  
 24 The book was ADAM SMITH by the British journalist Francis Hirst.  See HEALY, supra 
note 16, at 206. 
 25 Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
 26 Another example is Holmes’s introduction of the clear and present danger test in 
Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).  See HEALY, supra note 16, at 100–04; 
DAVID RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN YEARS 280–85 (1997).   
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wrote his Abrams dissent “quasi in furore”—a Latin phrase meaning “as 
if possessed.”27  An opinion written “as if possessed” is not likely to 
represent a fully developed and systematic view of a subject as complex 
as free speech. 
This is not to suggest that the market metaphor tells us nothing 
about the reasons behind Holmes’s support of free speech.  He was 
attached enough to the image to include it in a dissent he knew would 
invite attention and controversy.28  And, as Vincent Blasi has 
persuasively argued, there are many features of markets that appealed 
to Holmes and that give some coherence to his defense of free speech.  
Markets are premised on skepticism and competition, emphasize 
change and adaptation, reject fixed notions and orthodoxy.29  
But even if we accept that Holmes invoked the competition of the 
market because of these features, it is still a strange metaphor for him 
to have relied on for the very obvious reason that doing so conflicted so 
directly with his dissent in Lochner v. New York.30  If the due process 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “does not enact Mr. Herbert 
Spencer’s Social Statics,”31 how, if you are Holmes, can you suggest that 
the First Amendment enacts Adam Smith’s principles of free trade?  
More to the point, how can you rely on an economic metaphor to 
overturn convictions obtained under a law approved and enforced by 
the democratically elected branches of government? 
Holmes himself likely recognized this tension, as the key sentence 
in the final paragraph of his Abrams dissent suggests.  In asserting that 
“the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas” and 
“that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself 
accepted in the competition of the market,” Holmes makes clear that 
these are things “[men] may come to believe even more than they 
believe the very foundations of their own conduct,”32 not that they are 
things men must believe.  In other words, the propositions underlying 
the market metaphor are contestable. 
 
 27 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Felix Frankfurter (November 1, 1919), 
in 74 HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER; THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912–1934 (Robert M. Mennel et 
al., 1996). 
 28 See Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., to Frederick Pollock (November 6, 
1919), in 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS 29 (“Today I am stirred about 
a case that I can’t mention yet to which I have sent round a dissent that was prepared to 
be ready as soon as the opinion was circulated—I feel sure that the majority will very 
highly disapprove of my saying what I think, but as yet it seems to me my duty.”). 
 29 Blasi, supra note 3, at 24–33; see also MENAND, supra note 8, at xii. 
 30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
 31 Id.  
 32 Abrams, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  
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And yet, despite that contestability, the very next sentence of his 
dissent reads, “That at any rate is the theory of our constitution.”33  This 
is a bold assertion, and one would hope for some explanation or 
support—perhaps a reference to James Madison or Thomas Jefferson, a 
discussion of precedent, or some theoretical exegesis.  Instead, Holmes 
writes the following: 
It is an experiment, as all life is an experiment.  Every year if 
not every day we have to wager our salvation upon some 
prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.  While that 
experiment is part of our system I think that we should be 
eternally vigilant against attempts to check the expression of 
opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with death, 
unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference 
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an 
immediate check is required to save the country.34 
I had long viewed Holmes’s reference to “an experiment” in this 
passage as an offhand observation, the kind of epigrammatic flourish for 
which he was well known and often criticized.35  But I have come to 
believe that the metaphor of the experiment plays a more important role 
in Holmes’s defense of free speech than I once did and that it may help 
both to enhance our understanding of the marketplace of ideas and to 
serve as a corrective for our overreliance on that contested metaphor. 
III.  THE AMERICAN EXPERIMENT 
To understand what Holmes means by the experiment metaphor, 
we must answer two questions.  The first is what Holmes is referring to 
when he says, “It is an experiment.”  The preceding sentence reads, “That 
at any rate is the theory of our Constitution,” so he could be referring 
either to the Constitution itself or to “the theory of our Constitution” he 
has just outlined—i.e., the theory that “the ultimate good desired is 
better reached by free trade in ideas.” The second question is what 
Holmes means by the word experiment since that word has multiple 
definitions, more than one of which might shed light on Holmes’s view 
of free speech.  
I will begin with the first possibility—that Holmes is referring to 
the Constitution itself.  If that is the case, it seems likely Holmes is using 
the word experiment not in its scientific sense, not as “an action or 
 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 See, e.g., John M. Zane, A Legal Heresy, 53 AM. L. REV. 801, 811–14 n.23 (1919) (“He 
is a master of epigrammatic expression, of vivid and illuminating thought, but epigrams, 
unfortunately, are either half-truths or not truths at all.”); HEALY, supra note 16, at 10–
11, 78–81. 
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operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to test 
a hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth.”36  Instead, he 
is likely using the word in its more general sense, as a “method, system 
of things, or course of action, adopted in uncertainty whether it will 
answer the purpose.”37  The Constitution, under this definition, can thus 
be understood as an uncertain attempt to establish a system of popular 
government that might very well founder and fail.38 
This was a common understanding of American democracy during 
the nineteenth century, when monarchies and empires still ruled the 
world.  It was an understanding reflected in the writing of Alexis de 
Tocqueville, who described as unprecedented the “adventure” in 
popular government that was taking place in the United States.  “In that 
land the great experiment was to be made, by civilized man, of the 
attempt to construct society upon a new basis,” Tocqueville wrote in 
Democracy in America, in 1835.  “[A]nd it was there, for the first time, 
that theories hitherto unknown, or deemed impracticable, were to 
exhibit a spectacle for which the world had not been prepared by the 
history of the past.”39  The English historian and jurist James Bryce 
evinced a similar understanding in his 1887 book The Predictions of 
Hamilton and de Tocqueville. “The Constitution was an experiment, or 
rather a bundle of experiments, whose working there were few data for 
predicting,”40 Bryce observed. He returned to the image a year later in 
The American Commonwealth, writing that “[t]he institutions of the 
United States represent an experiment in the rule of the multitude, tried 
on a scale unprecedentedly vast, and the results of which everyone is 
concerned to watch.”41 
 
 
 36 Experiment, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989).  
 37 Id. 
 38 One might question whether, used this way, the word “experiment” is a metaphor 
at all.  In other words, one might think that Holmes is simply describing an attribute of 
the Constitution, much as if he wrote, “The Constitution is a document.”  What leads me 
to believe Holmes is using the word “experiment” figuratively, as opposed to literally, is 
the second half of the sentence—“as all life is an experiment.”  This phrase seems clearly 
metaphorical, and it would be odd to use the word “experiment” literally in the first half 
of the sentence and figuratively in the second half.  
 39 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 8 (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 
2019).  
 40 JAMES BRYCE, THE PREDICTIONS OF HAMILTON AND DE TOCQUEVILLE 7–8 (Herbert B. 
Adams ed., 1887). 
 41 JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH 1 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 1995) (1888). 
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Holmes read both Tocqueville and Bryce when he was younger.42  
In fact he and Bryce were good friends.  They had met in 1870 when 
Bryce made his first trip to America and kept up a steady 
correspondence until Bryce died in 1922.43  Holmes had even advised 
Bryce on aspects of The American Commonwealth and had been thanked 
by the author in its preface.44  So he was certainly familiar with the way 
both Tocqueville and Bryce had characterized American democracy.   
But one didn’t need familiarity with European writers to view the 
Constitution as an experiment.  Writers closer to home had made the 
same comparison.  In an oft-reproduced letter from 1804, Thomas 
Jefferson had written, “No experiment can be more interesting than that 
we are now trying, and which we trust will end in establishing the fact, 
that man may be governed by reason and truth.”45  Abraham Lincoln had 
also relied on the metaphor in a speech during his 1858 Senate race 
against Stephen Douglas.  Referring to the American innovation of 
popular sovereignty, he observed, “We made the experiment; and the 
fruit is before us.”46  And when, in the Gettysburg Address, Lincoln 
declared that “now we are engaged in a great Civil War, testing whether 
that nation or any nation so conceived and dedicated, can long endure,” 
 
 42 According to the list of books compiled by Holmes’s estate upon his death, he 
owned a copy of DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA that was given to him by his father on October 14, 
1862, while Holmes was at home recuperating from an injury suffered in the battle of 
Antietam a month earlier.  See ESTATE OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE LIBRARY, 602, https://iiif.lib.
harvard.edu/manifests/view/drs:42864702$33i (last visited July 31, 2020).  This was 
before Holmes began keeping a list of the books he read each year, so there is no 
definitive proof he read it.  But he almost certainly did.  The book was inscribed by his 
father as a gift, and Holmes remained home for another month before returning to the 
war, so he had plenty of time on his hands.  As for Bryce, Holmes included THE 
PREDICTIONS OF HAMILTON AND DE TOCQUEVILLE in his reading list for 1887.  THE AMERICAN 
COMMONWEALTH does not appear in the reading list, but Holmes had a copy inscribed by 
the author.  See ESTATE OF JUSTICE HOLMES: THE LIBRARY, 82, https://iiif.lib.harvard.edu/
manifests/view/drs:42864690$73i (last visited July 31, 2020).  And, as indicated, he 
advised Bryce on aspects of the book.  See text accompanying infra note 44. 
 43 See DUFFY GRAHAM, THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE LITIGATOR, 26 (The University of 
Michigan Press 2005).  The correspondence between Holmes and Bryce can be viewed 
on Harvard Law School Library’s OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR. DIGITAL SUITE, 
http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.php/ (last visited July 31, 2020).  
 44 BRYCE, supra note 41, at xxxiii.  
 45 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Judge John Tyler (June 28, 1804), in LETTERS AND 
ADDRESSES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 166 (William B. Parker & Jonas Viles eds., National 
Jefferson Society 1903).  
 46 Abraham Lincoln, Speech during Senate race (1858) (transcript available in the 
Gilder Lehrman Collection at The Gilder Lehrman Institute of American History), 
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-resources/spotlight-primary-source/lincoln-
speech-slavery-and-american-dream-1858. 
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he was once again calling attention to the experimental nature of the 
American system.47  
As this last quote illustrates, the Constitution was viewed as an 
experiment not only because of its novelty but also because of its 
fragility.  Whether it would succeed or fail was very much up in the air.  
And of course it almost did fail, as Holmes knew from personal 
experience, having served three years in the Union Army, having 
watched nearly all of his close friends killed, having been wounded three 
times, and having become convinced, at more than one point, that the 
experiment could not be salvaged.48  
So the idea that the Constitution was an experiment was not new 
to Holmes.  It was deeply embedded in his personal history, his political 
philosophy, and his worldview.  And it played a significant role in his 
approach to constitutional interpretation.  Holmes’s constitutional 
decisions are marked primarily by his commitment to majority rule and 
judicial restraint, but that was not because Holmes had a modest 
conception of the judicial role; he viewed judges as the primary shapers 
of the common law and urged them to decide cases explicitly on grounds 
of social policy.49  Instead, his reluctance to exercise the power of judicial 
review was based on his understanding of the experimental nature of 
the American system.  Like John Marshall, he viewed the Constitution 
not as a “legal code” designed to anticipate and answer all questions 
about the powers of government and the rights of individuals, but as a 
framework that could be adapted to meet changing circumstances so 
that it might, in Marshall’s words, “endure for ages to come.”50   
This view of the Constitution is evident in two of Holmes’s most 
famous opinions: Lochner and Missouri v. Holland.  In Lochner, Holmes 
objected to the majority’s invalidation of New York’s maximum hour law 
for bakers because he viewed it as favoring a particular economic 
theory.  “But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular 
economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the 
 
 47 Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address, Nov. 19, 1863 (emphasis added).  Herbert 
Croly, the editor of the New Republic magazine, also referred to the “American 
experiment” in his 1909 book The Promise of American Life, which Holmes had read and 
admired.  HERBERT CROLY, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LIFE (Princeton University Press 2014) 
(1909).  
 48 Holmes’s war service is well-documented in all the major biographies of his life.  
See, e.g., STEPHEN BUDIANSKY, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A LIFE IN WAR, LAW, AND IDEAS (2019).  
His doubts about whether the experiment could be salvaged are conveyed in letters he 
wrote home during the war.  See TOUCHED WITH FIRE: CIVIL WAR LETTERS AND DIARIES OF 
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR., 1861–1864 (Mark de Wolfe Howe, ed. 1946) 73, 79–80. 
 49 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW, 34 (The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 2009) (1881). 
 50 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 415 (1819).  
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citizen to the State or of laissez faire,” he responded in his dissent.  “It is 
made for people of fundamentally differing views.”51  In Missouri v. 
Holland, he rejected the state’s argument that Congress could not enter 
into a treaty for the protection of migratory birds simply because it 
lacked the power to regulate such birds in the absence of a treaty.  “It is 
obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the 
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but that 
a treaty followed by such an act could,” he wrote, “and it is not lightly to 
be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which 
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized government’ is 
not to be found.”52  Why was this not lightly to be assumed?  Because, 
Holmes explained, “when we are dealing with words that are also a 
constituent act, like the Constitution of the United States, we must 
realize that they have called into life a being the development of which 
could not have been foreseen completely by the most gifted of its 
begetters.”53   
Many of Holmes’s lesser-known opinions also reflect this view of a 
living, adaptable Constitution.  In his first opinion as a justice on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, he wrote that “[c]onsiderable latitude must be allowed 
for differences of view . . . . Otherwise a constitution, instead of 
embodying only relatively fundamental rules of right, as generally 
understood by all English-speaking communities, would become the 
partisan of a particular set of ethical or economical opinions, which by 
no means are held semper ubique et ab omnibus.”54  He returned to the 
theme again and again throughout his career, writing that a constitution 
is “a frame of government for men of opposite opinions, and for the 
future;”55 that its provisions “are not mathematical formulas having 
their essence in their form” but “are organic living institutions 
transplanted from English soil;”56 that they must therefore “be 
administered with caution;”57 that “[s]ome play must be allowed for the 
 
 51 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75–76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 52 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (quoting Andrews v. Andrews, 188 
U.S. 14, 33 (1903)).  
 53 Id. 
 54 Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606, 608–09 (1903).  The italicized phrase, translated from 
Latin, means roughly “always everywhere and by everyone.”   
 55 In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36 N.E. 488, 491 (Mass. 1894) (Opinion of Holmes, 
J.). 
 56 Gompers v. U.S., 233 U.S. 604, 610 (1914). 
 57 Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904). 
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joints of the machine;”58 and that “we should . . . not hastily import into 
[the Constitution] our own views.”59  
In most contexts, Holmes’s conception of the Constitution as an 
experiment led him to adopt a presumption of judicial restraint, since 
doing so would provide space for the legislature to enact measures it 
thought necessary to move the experiment forward.  In the context of 
free speech, however, he came to adopt a different presumption.  
Instead of judicial restraint serving the purpose of the experiment, it 
was legislative restraint that the Constitution called for—but for very 
similar reasons.  Just as judicial censorship of the legislature would 
hinder the country’s ability to adapt to changing circumstances, so 
legislative censorship of the people and the ideas they proposed for 
meeting future challenges would imperil the experiment’s success.  For 
experiments do not follow predictable paths.  They are marked by risk 
and uncertainty and cannot be pursued with fixed notions and rigid 
mindsets.  One embarking on an experiment cannot rule out strange 
ideas and unusual courses of action because one doesn’t know, ahead of 
time, what will be needed to meet the exigencies of the moment. 
Viewed in this light, Holmes’s assertion in Abrams that the 
Constitution “is an experiment” is more than just a throwaway line.  It is 
an observation about the nature of the document being interpreted, and, 
more importantly, about how that document should be interpreted.  
Precisely because the Constitution is an experiment, it cannot be 
interpreted to permit the silencing of views, since the views silenced 
might very well be essential to its success.  Uncertainty is the key 
premise here.  If we knew for sure which actions would guarantee the 
experiment’s success, free speech would be negotiable from a 
constitutional point of view.  It would, as Holmes once believed, stand 
“no differently than freedom from vaccination”60—a freedom that the 
legislature can curtail without significant scrutiny from the judiciary.  
But we don’t know anything for sure, as Holmes points out in the very 
next line of his Abrams dissent:  “Every year if not every day we have to 
wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon imperfect 
knowledge.”61  And in the face of that uncertainty (“While that 
experiment is part of our system”) and given the high stakes involved 
(“our salvation”), Holmes reaches what he believes is the only logical 
 
 58 Id.  
 59 In re Mun. Suffrage to Women, 36 N.E. at 491. 
 60 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Learned Hand (June 24, 1918) (on file with 
the Harvard Law School Library), http://library.law.harvard.edu/suites/owh/index.
php/item/43005319/8.  
 61 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (Holmes J., dissenting). 
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conclusion:  “we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check 
the expression of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught with 
death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country.”62 
Note that even in this last sentence, Holmes focuses on the survival 
of the country.  One objection to the idea that free speech will further 
the constitutional experiment might be that free speech is itself 
disruptive and destabilizing.  Especially in the context of war, we might 
view expressive freedom as a threat to the experiment’s success, not as 
an essential ingredient.  Holmes did not deny this possibility; he 
acknowledged that allowing people to speak their minds could lead to 
troubling, even disastrous, consequences.  And if the dangers were great 
enough—if “they so imminently threaten immediate interference with 
the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate check is 
required to save the country”—he was willing to set aside free speech 
because what mattered most, in his view, was the success of the 
constitutional experiment.  But when the country’s immediate survival 
was not in jeopardy, Holmes believed the best way to ensure that 
success was by protecting free speech.63   
This conception of free speech—as creating the conditions 
necessary to promote the constitutional experiment—is not in 
opposition to the market metaphor.  The features of markets that 
Holmes was attracted to—change and adaptation, an aversion to stasis 
and rigidity—are also features that are necessary for successful 
experimentation.  In that sense, we can regard the metaphor of the 
experiment as complimenting the market metaphor.64 
 
 62 Id.  I am not the first person to connect Holmes’s view of the Constitution as an 
experiment to his defense of free speech.  Louis Menand made a similar observation in 
his study of Holmes and other American pragmatists.  See MENAND, supra note 8, at 442 
(“The purpose of the experiment is to keep the experiment going.  This is the point of 
Holmes’s Abrams dissent . . . .”).  
 63 This is in contrast to Learned Hand, whose direct incitement test focused not on 
the danger posed by speech, but on the words used by the speaker.  See Masses 
Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  Unlike Holmes, Hand was 
concerned not primarily with the Constitution’s success, but with its legitimacy.  In his 
view, the legitimacy of the government depended upon the freedom to engage in open 
debate and hostile criticism.  But he did not think that freedom extended to direct 
incitement of unlawful activity because he viewed such speech as outside the scope of 
legitimate political discourse.  See Healy, supra note 10, at 826.  That is why his test 
permitted speech that threatened the survival of the country as long as it did not take 
the form of direct incitement and prohibited any speech, no matter how harmless, if it 
qualified as direct incitement.   
 64 See Blasi, supra note 3, at 4.  
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But highlighting the experiment metaphor and downplaying the 
market metaphor may have certain advantages.  For one, the 
experiment metaphor reconciles Holmes’s understanding of free speech 
with his general approach to constitutional interpretation.  It makes 
clear that Holmes supported free speech for the same reason he 
opposed freedom of contract—because he thought both positions 
enhanced the Constitution’s prospects for success—and thus minimizes 
the tension between his Abrams and Lochner dissents.   
The experiment metaphor also fits in nicely with other aspects of 
Holmes’s legal philosophy, most notably his observation in The Common 
Law that “the life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience.”65  
There is a close connection between the idea of experience Holmes 
invokes in that sentence and the definition of experiment I have been 
considering.  Holmes does not use the word “experience” in The Common 
Law the way we often use it today; he is not suggesting that the law has 
“skill” or “knowledge” or that it is “ancient” and “wise.”  Experience, as 
Holmes uses the word, is “the action of putting to the test.”66  Holmes is 
saying that the life of the common law has been “putting to the test” 
various policies and rules to determine which ones work—which ones 
meet the “felt necessities of the time.”67  This mirrors his conception of 
the Constitution.  In both cases, Holmes asserts that we cannot become 
tied to any particular policy or idea—even if we believe strongly in it—
because the success of a legal system requires that it remain open to 
change and adaptation.68  As Louis Menand has explained, “Holmes did 
not defend the interests of labor because he wished to see those 
interests prevail.  He defended them because he believed that every 
social interest should have its chance.  He believed in experiment.  He 
knew what the alternative was.”69  
Finally, the experiment metaphor has the advantage of being less 
doctrinaire than the market metaphor.  If there is one thing Holmes 
rebelled against with all his being it was orthodoxy, and laissez-faire 
economics is one of the most orthodoxical belief-systems we have.  It 
has traditionally come with a set of fixed assumptions about human 
behavior and the operation of markets, and it prizes efficiency above all 
else.  Those who apply market theory to free speech typically fall victim 
to the kind of rigid and formalistic thinking Holmes rejected.  The 
experiment metaphor, by contrast, comes with no assumptions and 
 
 65 HOLMES, supra note 49, at 1. 
 66 Experience, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1989). 
 67 HOLMES, supra note 49, at 1. 
 68 See MENAND, supra note 8, at 341–42. 
 69 Id. at 67.  
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prescribes no solutions.  It is a general framework for thinking about the 
nature of our constitutional system and the role of free speech in 
preserving that system.  That is an approach Holmes would have 
embraced. 
IV.  FREE SPEECH AND SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY 
So far, I have been considering what it would mean if Holmes were 
referring to the Constitution when he invokes the metaphor of the 
experiment.  But there is another possibility.  Holmes could instead (or 
also) be referring to the “theory of the Constitution” he has just 
outlined—the theory that “the ultimate good is best reached by free 
trade in ideas.”  In other words, Holmes could be saying that free speech 
itself is an experiment.  If this is what Holmes is referring to, then what 
is the meaning of experiment he has in mind?  He could have in mind the 
same definition considered above—“a course of action, adopted in 
uncertainty whether it will answer the purpose.”  But if Holmes is 
likening free speech to an experiment, we might consider another 
definition.  As mentioned earlier, an experiment can also be “an action 
or operation undertaken in order to discover something unknown, to 
test a hypothesis, or establish or illustrate some known truth.”70   
This is the scientific meaning of experiment, and it is one that 
Holmes also would have appreciated.  For if Holmes was interested in 
economics, he was shaped by science.71  His father was a medical doctor 
who served as dean of Harvard Medical School, published scientific 
papers, discovered the cause of puerperal fever, and invented a 
stereoscopic viewer.72  And Holmes, born in 1841, grew up in a world 
that was upended by scientific discovery, a world in which “science 
superseded theology as the dominant discourse in American intellectual 
life.”73  Writing in the Harvard Magazine as a 17-year-old freshman, 
Holmes described his generation as “almost the first of young men who 
have been brought up in an atmosphere of investigation, instead of 
having every doubt answered.”74  And sixty years later, when Morris 
Cohen asked Holmes whether his epistemic skepticism was influenced 
by the French philosopher Voltaire, Holmes’s response was revealing: 
 
 70 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.  
 71 See CATHARINE WELLS, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES: A WILLING SERVANT TO AN UNKNOWN 
GOD 29, 3, 111 (2020) (“Holmes believed in the scientific method, and had an enduring 
interest in applying it to the study of law”); Blasi, supra note 3, at 18 (“Holmes 
maintained an interest in science throughout his life”). 
 72 See BUDIANSKY, supra note 48, at 36; MENAND, supra note 8, at 6; WELLS, supra note 
71, at 16–17. 
 73 MENAND, supra note 8, at 81. 
 74 Id. at 25. 
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Oh no—it was not Voltaire—it was the influence of the 
scientific way of looking at the world . . . . The Origin of Species 
I think came out while I was in college.  H. Spencer announced 
his intention to put the universe into our pockets—I hadn’t 
read either of them to be sure, but as I say it was in the air.75 
It was more than “in the air.”  Scientific investigation and discovery 
was the basis for the philosophy of pragmatism that was ushered in by 
Holmes and the other members of the Metaphysical Club, including the 
psychologist William James, the philosopher Chauncey Wright, and the 
mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce.  All of these men, but especially 
Peirce, incorporated an understanding of science and the scientific 
method into their view of the world and their thinking about the nature 
of truth.76   
That understanding differed from the one embraced by previous 
generations.  In an earlier era, science had been dominated by a search 
for absolute truths and universal laws.  Peirce and the other members 
of the Metaphysical Club rejected that approach, believing that scientists 
could never know anything with absolute certainty.77  Instead, they 
could only “know with greater or lesser degrees of probability.”78  In 
their view, “truth” was simply another name for the hypothesis that had 
the best chance of being correct.  And the only way to make that 
determination was through repeated testing and experimentation.  “The 
opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, 
is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion 
is the real,” Peirce wrote.79  The point is best illustrated by the example 
of an astronomer trying to determine the exact position of a star.  No 
individual measurement the astronomer takes is likely to be precise.  
But if he takes numerous measurements over time, they will cluster 
around a point that represents the most likely position of the star.  And 
if other astronomers also take numerous measurements, they will 
eventually cluster so closely around a particular point that one can say 
with confidence, but not absolute certainty, where the star is located.80   
 
 
 75 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Morris Cohen (Feb. 5, 1919), in THE 
ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER 
WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 110, 110 (Richard A. Posner, ed. 1992).   
 76 See MENAND, supra note 8, at 59. 
 77 Id. at 363 (stating that Peirce, like James and Dewey, “regarded a belief as a kind 
of bet in a probabilistic universe”). 
 78 Id. at 182. 
 79 Id. at 229. 
 80 See id. at 177–80. 
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This approach to science had two defining features.  The most 
important was that no hypothesis could be rejected out of hand, that 
every claim had to be tested before one could draw conclusions about 
it.81  And if a test showed something other than what was expected, its 
results could not be dismissed or ignored.  Instead, scientists believed, 
aberrant measurements should be folded into the calculation, since one 
could never know for sure whether the outlier was right or wrong.82  
According to Menand, “Peirce’s first rule as a philosopher of science was 
that the path of inquiry should never be blocked, not even by a 
hypothesis that has worked for us in the past.”83   
The second feature of this approach to science was that the process 
of experimentation—of gradually closing in on the truth—is social, not 
individual.84  No individual could take enough measurements in one 
lifetime to approximate the truth.  But if different scientists using 
different methods took different measurements, society would, over 
time, come near enough to the truth for any purpose it might 
conceivably desire to take.85  
Holmes believed deeply in this view of knowledge and the scientific 
method.  Although in later years he denied having been influenced by 
Peirce, the two men shared a belief that we can never know the truth for 
certain; we can only make bets.86  That is why Holmes described himself 
as a bettabilitarian.  “I believe that we can bet on the behavior of the 
universe in its contract with us,” he wrote to his friend Sir Frederick 
Pollock, in 1929.  “We bet we can know what it will be.”87  Holmes also 
believed that no idea was ever immune from challenge.  In a lecture 
given in 1886, he declared that “science like courage is never beyond the 
necessity of proof but must always be ready to prove itself against all 
challengers.”88 
So what does this have to do with free speech?  If we view Holmes’s 
Abrams dissent as likening free speech to the methods of scientific 
experimentation, then the principles he understood as governing 
science should also govern free speech.  That means first, there is no 
such thing as a false idea because every idea must be tested before we 
 
 81 See JONATHAN RAUCH, KINDLY INQUISITORS: THE NEW ATTACKS ON FREE THOUGHT 5–6 
(Univ. of Chi. Press expanded ed., 2013). 
 82 Id. at 182–83. 
 83 MENAND, supra note 8, at 276. 
 84 Id. at 200. 
 85 Id. at 229.   
 86 MENAND, supra note 8, at 217. 
 87 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock (August 30, 1929), in 2 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 251, 252 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1942).  
 88 BUDIANSKY, supra note 48, at 138. 
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can evaluate its veracity.  And second, it means that free speech, like 
science, is a social process.  One person introduces an idea; another 
person expands on that idea; a third person refutes part of the idea; a 
fourth person rebuts the refutation.  No single person possesses the 
truth, but through the process of debate and discussion we gradually 
move closer to the truth—close enough so that, in Holmes’s words, our 
“wishes safely can be carried out.”89  Or as Menand puts it, “The purpose 
of all scientific investigation is therefore to push our collective opinions 
about the world closer and closer to agreement with each other, and 
thus closer and closer to the limit represented by reality itself.”90  
As should be clear, these are not just abstract principles for 
thinking about free speech; they closely track modern free speech 
doctrine.  Perhaps the most important development of free speech law 
over the past half century has been the Supreme Court’s embrace of 
content neutrality—the idea that government cannot regulate speech 
based upon its content and, in particular, its viewpoint.  That idea closely 
resembles the scientific precept that there is “no final say”—that inquiry 
can never be blocked because we think we already know the truth.91  
Another key premise of modern free speech doctrine is that everyone’s 
ideas are equally valid as far as the First Amendment is concerned.  “One 
man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric,” the Supreme Court asserted in Cohen 
v. California.92  This premise echoes Pierce’s claim that no one has 
personal authority because truth-seeking is a social process, not an 
individual endeavor.93   
As with the definition of experiment considered above, this 
conception of free speech—as resembling scientific inquiry—does not 
conflict with the market metaphor.  In fact, the pragmatists viewed 
markets and scientific experimentation as deriving from the same 
concept of probabilistic thinking.94  But once again, there may be 
advantages to highlighting the experiment metaphor at the expense of 
the market metaphor.  Unlike the market metaphor, the metaphor of 
scientific experimentation doesn’t assume that the truth will necessarily 
prevail; instead, it posits that the only way to get close to the truth—
close enough to safely act—is by hearing and investigating all views.  In 
 
 89 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
Jonathan Rauch refers to these two principles—which he calls, respectively, “no final 
say” and “no personal authority”—as the basis of “liberal science.”  See RAUCH, supra note 
81, at 46–49. 
 90 MENAND, supra note 8, at 228. 
 91 See RAUCH, supra note 81, at 46. 
 92 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971). 
 93 See RAUCH, supra note 81, at 46. 
 94 Blasi, supra note 3, at 19–29; MENAND, supra note 8, at 431. 
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addition, the market metaphor implies a kind of indiscriminate and 
frivolous browsing.  There is no sense of rigor or discipline, no sense of 
a purpose toward which the browsing is directed.  To think about free 
speech and the exchange of ideas in terms of scientific experiment is to 
provide a more serious reference point.  Where the market metaphor 
trivializes free speech, the metaphor of the experiment elevates it.  
Instead of consumers searching for an idea that suits us like a set of 
clothes, we become scientists probing the cosmos for a truth that will 
aid our survival. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
There are, of course, limits to thinking about free speech in terms 
of scientific experimentation.  Not everyone has access to the tools of 
science.  And not every idea can be tested empirically (though, as 
Jonathan Rauch has pointed out, even moral claims can be investigated 
and challenged).95  But analogizing free speech to the scientific method 
has benefits nonetheless.  It helps to situate Holmes’s dissent not as a 
product of the age of capitalism, but as a product of the age of Darwin.  
It shifts the focus from producers and consumers exchanging ideas in an 
indifferent marketplace to scientists and thinkers testing hypotheses in 
an effort to promote the “ultimate good.”   
In this shift, we can hear echoes of John Stuart Mill, who in On 
Liberty also invoked the idea of scientific experimentation as a 
justification for the protection of speech.  “If even the Newtonian 
philosophy were not permitted to be questioned, mankind could not feel 
as complete assurance of its truth as they now do,” Mill wrote. “The 
beliefs which we have most warrant for, have no safeguard to rest on, 
but a standing invitation to the whole world to prove them 
unfounded.”96 
Mill published those words in 1859, sixty years before the Abrams 
case.  At the time, it must have seemed unimaginable to him that 
Newtonian physics would ever be disproven.  That is why he uses it as 
an example.  It is meant to show that even the most unshakeable beliefs 
must be subjected to challenge.  And yet, his words proved prescient.  On 
November 10, 1919, the same day Holmes issued his dissent in Abrams, 
the New York Times published a front-page article reporting on the 
 
 95 See RAUCH, supra note 81, at 172–73 (pointing out that even moral claims can be 
checked and challenged “through logical analysis, consistency with established facts, 
consistency with personal experience, facial plausibility, proponents’ and opponents’ 
credibility, ideas’ aesthetic appeal (many physicists have regarded beauty as a sign of 
truth), and the residual X factor we call persuasiveness”). 
 96 JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, 37 (2015) (ebook).  
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proceedings of the Royal Astronomical Society in London.97  Five 
months earlier, during a solar eclipse, British scientists had tested a 
controversial new theory about the relationship between space and 
light.  When they reported the results in London, Einstein’s theory of 
relativity was validated, and Newton’s classical mechanics was 
smashed.  A truth that had once seemed unimpeachable was now 
displaced.  And the mechanism for that displacement was not the 
marketplace of ideas.  It was an experiment. 
 
 
 97 Lights All Askew in the Heavens, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 1919, at 17.  
